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This paper examines the complex factors facilitating the 
rise of high frequency trading (HFT) from a historical 
perspective.  Over the course of several decades, various 
stock market regulations and reforms, championed by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), created room 
for HFT to develop and flourish.  While advancements in 
technology initially may appear to be the primary cause of 
HFT, in fact, HFT could not exist (or at least, not to the 
extent it does today) if certain rules and older ways of doing 
business on the exchanges were still in place, and if other 
regulations did not support its existence.  This paper 
identifies multiple factors contributing to the eventual rise 
of HFT: decimalization, the decline of the specialist system, 
market fragmentation, rate deregulation, the repeal of the 
uptick rule, demutualization of the stock exchanges, and the 
institution of Regulation National Market System [NMS].  
Moreover, it seeks to position these developments within the 
broader context of long-standing aims and themes 
embraced by the SEC. 
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Introduction 
Detailing the stunning rise of high frequency trading (HFT) in his 
2014 best-seller Flash Boys, Michael Lewis argues that high frequency 
traders have rigged the stock market to the disadvantage of many retail 
and institutional investors.1  Making a similar contention in their own 
book, Broken Markets, Sal Arnuk and Joseph Saluzzi (2012) lament that 
markets are “broken” due in part to the rapid proliferation of HFT.  Such 
criticisms have helped spark widespread debate about the effects and 
legitimacy of HFT, as well as its causes.2  At first glance, advancements 
in technology may appear to be the primary cause of HFT, but 
technological innovation does not happen in a vacuum; often, it is a 
response to market opportunities. Lewis, Arnuk, and Saluzzi all trace the 
genesis of HFT to changes in market structure driven by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and they focus on developments that 
have occurred roughly over the past fifteen years.3  Indeed, various 
market reforms championed by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) over many decades created room for HFT to develop and flourish.  
This essay explores those factors that facilitated and contributed to the 
rise of HFT from a broad historical perspective.  HFT could not exist (or 
at least, not to the extent it does today) if certain rules and older ways of 
doing business on the exchanges were still in place, and if other 
regulations did not support its existence.  This paper delves into 
decimalization, the decline of the specialist system, market 
fragmentation, rate deregulation, the repeal of the uptick rule, 
demutualization of the stock exchanges, and the institution of Regulation 
National Market System [NMS] as key factors that facilitated the 
eventual rise of HFT.4  Moreover, it seeks to position these developments 
within the broader context of long-standing aims and themes embraced 
by the SEC.  First, however, it is necessary to explore the concept of high 
frequency trading, and define this practice. 
 
High Frequency Trading Defined 
Problematically, high frequency trading has been inconsistently 
defined by the popular press, academics, and even its practitioners.5  As 
Andrew Kumiega at Infinium Capital Management once remarked, 
“High-frequency trading means everything to everyone.”6 The resulting 
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haziness surrounding the concept adds to confusion about HFT’s 
legitimacy as well as its root causes.  It is important, therefore, to 
articulate clearly what is HFT (and what is not HFT).   High frequency 
trading is neither synonymous with electronic trading nor algorithmic 
trading, although it utilizes both.  Electronic trading involves placing buy 
and sell orders for stocks or other financial products over a computer 
network, typically via a broker or a stock exchange. Algorithmic trading 
(sometimes dubbed “algo trading” or “automated trading”) goes one step 
further, using electronic platforms to input trading orders that depend on 
algorithms.7  Algorithms contain pre-programmed and hence automatic 
trading instructions, such as when to buy or sell a stock, how many 
shares, and at what price. Algorithmic trading utilizes program trading, 
which grew alongside the rise in electronic communication networks 
(ECNs). Electronic exchanges such as Instinet and Archipelago 
Exchange enabled the ultra quick matching of myriad buy and sell 
orders, all via computer, all absent the human touch.8 
High-frequency trading (HFT) typically involves fast algorithmic, 
automated electronic trading that relies on information that is obtained 
electronically to make order decisions.  Yet HFT entails more than this.  
Speed, as measured by latency, is a hallmark of high-frequency trading.9  
However, the “F” in “HFT” does not stand for “FAST”; it stands for 
“FREQUENCY”, as HFT darts in-and-out of positions often within 
milliseconds to take advantage of tiny arbitrage opportunities across 
exchanges.  HFT relies on heavy trading volume--frequency of trades--to 
profit from these small differentials.10   
Finally, as will be explained, HFT also often involves traders being 
able to glimpse other market orders – to have a valuable look or sneak 
peek at order flow before they place their own orders.11  That look 
(combined with the speed to act upon it and the frequency to do so) 
substantially enhances the likelihood of high frequency traders making 
profits. The more advance a look at order flow an HFT firm enjoys, the 
more likely it is to outshine its competitors’ performances, including that 
of other HFT firms.   
In acquiring a millisecond or microsecond information advantage 
over other traders, computing speed is a key asset, as is “co-location” 
near an exchange’s computers.  Testifying before Congress in June 2014, 
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Senator John McCain described co-location as a “key tactic used by 
high-frequency trading firms.”  He explained, “This practice involves 
trading firms literally renting space for their computers in the same room 
as the computers that run the stock exchanges so that they can receive 
market information directly from the exchanges’ computers as fast as 
possible.” 12  Close physical proximity to an exchange’s computers is one 
way to reduce impedance by shaving milliseconds off the time it takes 
data transmission lines to relay critical order information.13  
In addition to relying on co-location, HFT firms14 also try to peek 
into exchanges and detect orders as they initiate from a broker’s order 
router. HFT firms often place small orders (which they sometime cancel) 
to try to flesh out buying or selling pressure, perhaps particularly from 
those wanting to move large, block orders.  
By whatever means they obtain the look or sneak peek at order flow 
(or even potential order flow), the ability of HFT firms to access and act 
upon valuable knowledge in advance of other market participants 
potentially could disadvantage other traders.  As Georgetown scholars 
James Angel and Douglas McCabe (2013, p. 589) explain, “So-called 
‘predatory’ algorithms, or ‘algos,’ figure out that a large order is in the 
process of execution and jump in front of it.” While Angel and McCabe 
view this as one of HFT’s “predictive strategies,” critics allege that HFT 
(or, more precisely, the look aspect of HFT) is a form of front-running.15  
Generally, front running involves someone who is privy to order 
flow knowledge and then acts upon it for his or her own profit by 
jumping ahead of customers to trade (buy or sell) for his or her own 
account.16  Front-running in most cases is illegal, as it confers an unfair 
advantage to the person who engages in the practice.17  Although some 
are quick to deride HFT as front-running,18 Angel and McCabe are more 
circumspect, noting, “While it is clear that brokers who front run their 
own customers are violating their ethical duties to their customers, it is 
not clear that there is anything wrong with investors using information 
that is publicly available to everyone to make their trading decisions.”  
Yet, as they note, there is the complicating factor that “some investors 
have access to faster computers than others.”19 
Seeing things more black and white, Michael Lewis has sharply 
criticized HFT, blaming it for devolving the U.S. stock market into “a 
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class system, rooted in speed, of haves and have-nots.  The haves paid 
for nanoseconds; the have-nots had no idea that a nanosecond had value.  
The haves enjoyed a perfect view of the market; the have-nots never saw 
the market at all.”  Lewis laments, “What had once been the world’s 
most public, most democratic, financial market had become, in spirit, 
something more like a private viewing of a stolen work of art.”20  Lewis’ 
incendiary charges of a rigged stock market have heightened pressure on 
the SEC (that already had been investigating HFT) to issue new 
regulations to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the practice.   
Before regulators rush to fix the perceived problem of HFT, 
however, it is worthwhile to examine closely the true root causes of HFT 
in order to form effective solutions, if solutions are indeed needed.  In 
ferreting out the underlying causes of HFT, it becomes clear that the SEC 
in many ways and over several decades ironically helped create an 
environment conducive to HFT, the very practice it now seeks to curb.  
Before discussing some of the specific actions that ultimately catalyzed 
HFT, it is helpful to understand the original intentions underlying the 
SEC’s creation in 1934, and certain assumptions that have long guided 
the SEC.  As will be seen, the SEC, in its quest to make markets a better 
place for small, ordinary investors, actually wound up fostering an HFT-
friendly environment.  
 
Creation of the SEC and Core Assumptions Guiding Its Actions 
Over the Years 
On June 6, 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law the 
Securities and Exchange Act, which momentously brought the nation’s 
stock exchanges under federal regulation.21  The SEC’s mission has been 
“to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and 
facilitate capital formation.”22 Notably, the NYSE historically also has 
placed enormous importance on ensuring “fair and orderly” markets.23 
Yet arguably, the NYSE considered “fair” and “orderly” to be closer to 
synonymous than did the SEC.  The NYSE interpreted a “fair and 
orderly” market in part to mean one that did not wildly fluctuate.  Like 
the SEC, the NYSE also had a notion that fairness meant making sure 
that small and big investors alike had equal opportunity to achieve 
investing success.  The SEC’s notion of fairness led to the agency 
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championing various market reforms, many of which yielded positive 
impacts, but sometimes also led to largely unforeseen consequences such 
as HFT.   
The very creation of the SEC stemmed from the perceived need to 
correct unfairness in the markets and the belief by some that the NYSE 
and other exchanges were not up to the task of doing so themselves.  The 
legislation emanated from more than three years of Congressional 
investigations into stock market practices following the devastating Great 
Crash of 1929.  Frustrated that the NYSE too often seemed to look the 
other way when it came to stock manipulations such as pools24, critics of 
Wall Street contended that the NYSE and other stock exchanges needed 
to be brought under external control to ensure fairness.  A compromise 
between government reformers and moderate factions on Wall Street, the 
Securities and Exchange Act, though, left the exchanges as primarily 
self-regulatory organizations (SROs).  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), created in section 4 of the Act, was only supposed to 
act when self-regulation failed. The drafters of the legislation25 intended 
that the SEC would help protect investors if the exchanges failed to act 
on their own.  They also hoped that the very existence of a cop on the 
corner of Wall Street (in the form of the SEC) would inspire greater 
public trust in the integrity of the markets.   
Despite the compromises embedded in the Act, some members of the 
Wall Street community expressed deep concern about its passage.  Old 
Guard leaders of the NYSE, such as Charles Gay and Richard Whitney, 
lamented the loss of their organization’s complete independence and 
contended that outsiders could not effectively even co-regulate the 
securities markets due to their lack of understanding of the complex 
operations underlying the exchanges.26 They worried that any SEC 
meddling—even with benign intentions related to the agency’s fairness 
mission—might unleash a bevy of negative, unintended consequences.  
Even though President Roosevelt appointed Joseph P. Kennedy,27 a 
former trader himself, to be the first head of the SEC, the Exchange’s 
conservative wing remained suspicious that the SEC intended to take 
away the NYSE’s historic power over its own house.   
Kennedy’s next two successors as SEC chairman (who were 
attorneys, not former market professionals) – James Landis (1935-1937) 
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and William O. Douglas (1937-1939) – vocally supported the idea that 
the securities industries should mostly be self-regulated, albeit subject to 
SEC supervision.28  As Landis reassured Wall Street at a meeting of the 
New York Stock Exchange Institute in the summer of 1935,  “Self-
government is, of course, the desirable thing.   Everyone will admit that 
the less regulation there is, the better it will be, provided the objectives 
are always kept clear; and the better the self-government, the less need 
there is for regulation.”29  Also adamant that the SEC should intervene 
only if and when self-regulation failed, William O. Douglas once 
explained that the idea was to “keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the 
door, loaded, well-oiled, cleaned, ready for use, but with the hope that it 
would never have to be used.”30   
Feeling the threat of SEC intervention looming over them and 
anxious to avoid it, the NYSE in the Great Depression years worked to 
make markets more fair, in part by having its Business Conduct 
Committee more aggressively patrol the Exchange floor and root out 
such obviously detrimental practices such as pools and corners by which 
insiders tried to manipulate stocks.  The NYSE and the SEC 
harmoniously agreed about the need to eradicate certain practices.  Yet 
on larger market structure issues and how they might be modified to 
make markets more fair, the SEC often perceived matters differently than 
the NYSE, even after the Exchange underwent a pivotal internal 
reorganization in 1938.  While the SEC’s leadership has changed hands 
many times since 1934, analyzing certain overarching themes in the 
SEC’s attitude and approach to the NYSE over the years can yield 
insights into what the SEC believes will make the markets more fair. 
First, the SEC long has held that markets would be fairer if they were 
more fragmented. For most of the NYSE’s existence, the NYSE was by 
far the largest exchange in the country and the world, handling the vast 
majority of stock trades. The NYSE defensively argued that it was a 
natural monopoly, and hence such concentration was in the best interests 
of investors and the Exchange alike.  Yet the SEC feared the NYSE’s 
dominant market share, concerned that such a concentration meant 
higher order execution prices for investors as well as other problems.  
Second, the SEC, particularly in the last half century, has had faith in the 
power of technology to make markets more democratic, in part because 
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technology could presumably reduce transaction costs.  Third, as will be 
discussed, the SEC believed markets would be fairer if floor traders31 and 
specialists32 exerted less influence (or were abolished altogether).  In 
fact, in the original draft of the Securities Act of 1934, Section 10 of the 
proposed bill would have ended the role of floor traders and would have 
removed specialists’ ability to trade for their own accounts.33   
As will be detailed, in time the SEC largely got the environment it 
sought–a considerably weakened NYSE, a diminished role for 
specialists, enhanced technology and a reduced human factor, and much 
cheaper commission costs for both retail and institutional investors. Yet 
the SEC also got—for better or for worse—HFT.  Understanding how 
certain SEC initiatives helped foster HFT requires carefully examining 
pivotal developments such as decimalization, the end to fixed 
commission rates, the repeal of the uptick rule, and the institution of 
Regulation NMS.  More broadly, beyond better understanding the rise of 
HFT, an analysis of these developments illuminates how an increasingly 
activist SEC has helped shape modern securities markets and how the 
SEC’s original notion of largely maintaining the NYSE’s historic SRO 
status has withered away as the SEC has aggressively pursued its own 
ideas of how to bring more fairness to U.S. equity markets.  In the 
process, the NYSE’s fundamental nature has been transformed, along 
with the investing landscape.  
 
The NYSE as an Auction Market and The Specialist System  
For more than two centuries, the NYSE had been an auction market, 
until recently when it became a more hybrid model.  In the case of an 
auction market (as opposed to a dealer’s market in which those wishing 
to buy and sell have to go through a dealer), the highest bidding price for 
a stock is matched against the lowest asking price.34  At the NYSE for 
more than a century, it was the job of the specialist in his agency role to 
bring together buyers and sellers, thereby facilitating trades.  For most of 
the NYSE’s history, every trade used to have to go through a specialist.  
Specialists, therefore, occupied a unique position on the NYSE floor.  In 
recent years, however, the power of the specialists has been vastly 
diminished.35  Understanding the historical role played by the specialists 
enables one to appreciate how this system, if left intact, might have 
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served as a balance to the otherwise largely unchecked influence of HFT. 
The position of NYSE specialist dates back to 1871. In that year the 
NYSE moved to continuous trading in stocks and away from the prior 
system (in place since 1792) of daily call auctions in individual stocks.  
Initially, brokers were overwhelmed by the challenges posed by 
continual, simultaneous trading of stocks; they had been accustomed to 
being able to monitor every stock as it traded.  Soon, however, some 
floor brokers stumbled upon a solution: they could profitably specialize 
in working orders for a particular stock from a stationary post on the 
exchange floor.  The specialist position thus developed.36  
Throughout the twentieth century, the NYSE vigorously defended 
the specialist position as necessary and beneficial to investors and the 
market as a whole. While critics pointed to the specialist’s privileged 
position on the floor, the NYSE emphasized that in return for the 
advantages associated with that position, the specialist had a 
responsibility to provide a “fair and orderly market,” which included 
being compelled to trade, if circumstances necessitated, against his 
firm’s financial interest.  This could entail injecting much-needed 
liquidity into stocks during tumultuous times by committing his firm’s 
capital.37  While the concept of a “fair and orderly market” has never 
been strictly defined, the NYSE historically interpreted it to mean, in 
part, a market that does not gyrate hugely.  The specialist was supposed 
to act to stabilize prices, provide capital if needed, and facilitate order 
executions for other members.38  As the NYSE once explained, “To 
ensure that stock trading moves smoothly, with minimal price 
fluctuation, the specialist will step in against the market trend.  
Specialists buy and sell stock to cushion temporary imbalances and to 
avoid unreasonable price variations.” The NYSE added, “As a dealer, the 
specialist will buy or sell stock from his own inventory to keep the 
market liquid or to prevent rapid price changes.”39  In a sense, specialists 
controlled the order flow, as they continually made judgment calls about 
who got to participate in trades and in what order.40   
Deeming liquidity to be “one of the most important characteristics of 
a good market,” the NYSE has defined liquidity as “depth of market to 
absorb buy and sell interest of even large orders at prices appropriate to 
supply and demand.”41  To the NYSE, liquidity and market fairness are 
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intertwined concepts.  Because specialists enhanced liquidity, specialists, 
according to the traditional NYSE argument, did much to make markets 
more orderly.42   
The NYSE, however, conceded that there were some abuses of the 
specialist system at various junctures. Unfortunately, as Ferdinand 
Pecora had uncovered, some specialists in the 1920s had exploited their 
roles by arranging profitable pools in the very stocks in which they were 
making markets, such as trader Michael Meehan had done with Radio 
Corporation of America (RCA).  Agreeing with critics that such episodes 
should be prevented from reoccurring, the NYSE Governing Committee 
in 1934 banned members from participating in stock pools, proscribed 
specialists from “disclosing to any person, other than certain committees 
of the Exchange, any information in regard to orders entrusted to 
[them],” and also prohibited specialists “from acquiring or granting any 
option in the stocks in which they specialize.”43   
In enacting these rules to more tightly govern the specialist system, 
the NYSE also hoped to prove that the NYSE indeed was capable of self-
regulation, and that some type of national securities legislation was 
therefore unnecessary.  That same year, however, the Securities and 
Exchange Act created the SEC.  Critics of the NYSE demanded an end to 
the specialist function on the exchanges,44 but the SEC at the time did not 
heed their calls, fearing the potential consequences of such a drastic 
change in stock market operations.   
In subsequent decades, however, criticisms of the specialist system 
continued to surface. Notably, a Special Study of the Securities Markets 
in 1963 expressed concern about certain stock market practices, such as 
the freedom with which specialists seemed to act.45  Other studies found 
that during periods of crisis (like the assassination of President Kennedy 
on November 12, 1963), the specialist system did not always stabilize the 
market in the way it was intended, because certain specialists sometimes 
acted to protect their own interests or were inadequately capitalized and, 
thus, were simply overwhelmed by disproportionate volume on one side 
of the market.   Similar to what transpired after the Pecora Investigation 
in the 1930s, the NYSE’s Board of Governors in 1964 modified and 
expanded its own rules concerning the specialists, in an effort to thwart 
additional SEC involvement.  The NYSE instituted several procedural 
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changes, such as more detailed policies concerning liquidation of 
positions.46  The NYSE President at the time, Keith Funston, along with 
Chairman of the Board Henry Watts, were quick to emphasize, however, 
that these revised procedures did not alter the core of the specialist 
system—nor should it, since the specialist system was designed so as to 
maintain a healthy auction market for securities.47   
Despite enduring criticisms, the specialist system remained basically 
unaltered until the 21st century when, as will be discussed, certain 
developments occurred that catalyzed action.48  By that time, other 
transformations of the securities markets already had taken place such as 
rate deregulation, the creation of a national market system, 
demutualization of the exchanges, the enactment of Regulation NMS, 
and the repeal of the uptick rule.  All of this created a “perfect storm” of 
sorts.49  Once the technology became available and once entrepreneurs 
imaginatively envisioned the possibilities of exploiting nearly de minimis 
arbitrage opportunities through extensive rapid trading, HFT could 
develop with few roadblocks in the way of its growth. 
 
Rate Deregulation and the Creation of a National Market System 
(1975) 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the SEC focused on the need to lower 
trading costs for investors and relatedly, the necessity of encouraging 
more broker competition.  In the aftermath of the 1963 Special Study, the 
SEC in 1968 mandated the end of minimum, fixed commission rates on 
all US stock exchanges—a practice that had been in place at the NYSE 
since its founding in 1792.50  The NYSE for a time fought the move to 
negotiated rates, but eventually capitulated. Exchange President Robert 
Haack gradually came to the conclusion that fixed rates were actually 
harming the NYSE, causing the organization to lose too much business 
to cheaper competitors and fostering “inept management” at several 
member brokerage firms.51  While Haack was expressing his personal 
views, eventually the NYSE Board also became convinced of the need to 
jettison fixed rates and the futility of fighting the SEC on the issue.  
By May 1975, the move to negotiated rates was fully implemented.  
While much has been written about “May Day 1975” and the subsequent 
rise of discount brokerage firms,52 the long-term impacts of rate 
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deregulation still are not well understood.  For example, it is not well 
appreciated how the resulting revenue loss impelled member firms to 
embrace more heavily a higher risk activity, proprietary trading (i.e., 
trading solely for their own gain), in an attempt to replace the lost 
revenue from their traditional brokerage and block trading operations 
(i.e., facilitating customer trades to earn commissions and buy/sell 
spreads).53  Prior to 1975, proprietary trading on the part of member 
firms was extremely limited.  Inspired by May Day to brainstorm about 
potential alternative revenue streams, some member firms such as 
Goldman Sachs honed in on the idea of expanding their small arbitrage 
desks into what later became known as algo trading.  Trading algorithms 
that today are at the heart of successful HFTs were first used in the 1980s 
and 1990s amidst these expanding proprietary trading operations.  
In the same year as rate deregulation, Congress passed the Securities 
Acts Amendments of 1975, also known as the National Exchange Market 
System Act.  It amended Section 11A of the Securities Exchange Act of 
193454, which mandated that the SEC propel forward the creation of a 
national market system (NMS) — which would “link together the 
multiple individual markets that trade securities.”  As the SEC recounts, 
“Congress intended the Commission [through Section 11A] to take 
advantage of opportunities created by new data processing and 
communication technologies to preserve and strengthen the securities 
markets.”  According to the SEC, the NMS was “designed to achieve the 
objectives of efficient, competitive, fair and orderly markets that are in 
the public interest and protect investors.”55   
The creation of a national market system enables thousands of listed 
stocks today to be (in the words of the SEC) “traded simultaneously at a 
variety of different venues that participate in the NMS, including 
national securities exchanges, alternative trading systems [ATSs]…, and 
market-making securities dealers.”56  The creation of the NMS was also 
an attempt to reduce the power of the NYSE, in part by fragmenting the 
market and inspiring the creation of many new stock exchanges.  This 
fragmentation, in turn, created arbitrage opportunities from what at first 
seemed to be insignificant price differentials between the multiple 
markets.   
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At the time of the creation of the national market system in the 
1970s, the NYSE still was indisputably the most powerful exchange in 
the country, boasting the highest market share. Congress and the SEC, 
concerned that such market concentration was not in the best interests of 
investors, contemplated effective ways to diffuse that power, hoping that 
doing so would make the markets more fair. Both the SEC and Congress 
possessed great faith that if only the equity markets would tap into newly 
available data processing and communications technologies, they could 
become much more competitive, efficient and fair than if the exchanges 
continued to rely on human judgment to facilitate trades. 
In the ensuing decades since 1975, the Commission, endeavoring to 
keep abreast of evolving market conditions (some of which the SEC’s 
actions bred), periodically has revised the rules governing the national 
market system.  As will be explored, Regulation NMS, first proposed in 
2004 and then approved in 2005, is part of that long history.57   
First, however, it is important to examine how another landmark 
transition prodded by the SEC, the decimalization of stock prices, further 
reduced the profitability of member firms. This propelled some firms to 
embrace riskier activities in order to compensate for the reduced revenue 
stream.  
 
Decimalization of Stock Prices (2001) and the Repeal of the Uptick 
Rule (2007) 
In 2001, the NYSE adopted the practice of quoting stocks in 
decimals, meaning pennies, rather than fractions. As CNBC senior editor 
John Carney recalled, “Beginning in the 1990s, the SEC began a 
campaign to undermine the old [fractional] system.”58  In a 1994 report, 
the SEC staff blamed the then-current dollar tick size of 1/8th for 
“caus[ing] artificially wide spreads and hinder[ing] price competition” 
and in the process, engendering excessive profits for market makers.59  
Reducing the tick size and changing to decimal pricing, contended 
advocates like Arthur Levitt (SEC Chairman, 1993-2001), would help 
investors by resulting in smaller spreads on trades.60  This might benefit 
especially small retail investors, since large institutions were already able 
to get better net prices by negotiating commission rates on block trades.  
According to SEC Commissioner Steve Wallman, if the NYSE and other 
Traflet and Gruver  
 
157 
Essays in Economic & Business History Volume XXXIII, 2015 
exchanges were forced to reduce their minimum tick size, decimalization 
would save retail investors roughly $1.5 billion a year.61  The idea was 
that “smaller trading increments would intensify competition among all 
sorts of limit order traders.  Market makers, day-traders, hedge funds, 
and arbitrageurs would all try to better each other’s quotes, leading to 
price improvement for the customer,” as Peter Chapman at Traders 
Magazine explained in a 1999 cover story on pending decimalization.62 
Average investors might also find stock prices quoted in dollars and 
cents easier to understand than if they were quoted in fractions.  
Converting to decimals, therefore, purportedly would make markets 
more fair.  The SEC also believed that decimalization would make 
markets more fair by impeding market makers from making so much 
money on the spreads. 
Many also derided fractional pricing as anachronistic, and indeed, 
the practice dated back to the 17th century colonial custom of using 
Spanish coins, which were called “pieces of eight” because they could be 
broken into eight “bit” pieces.  As Representative Michael Oxley, an 
ardent proponent of decimalization, complained in 1997, “When 
organized stock trading began in New York in 1792, stock prices were 
quoted in bits, or eighths. We don't use Spanish coins today--but the 
tradition of pricing stocks based on these coins is still with us, in the 
form of SRO rules.”63 Advocates of decimalization further noted that in 
many exchanges in other countries, decimalization was already the 
standard practice. As SEC Chairman Levitt said, “The U.S. securities 
markets must adopt the international convention of decimal pricing in 
order to remain competitive.”64   
Consequently, in March 1997, Representatives Michael Oxley (R-
Ohio) and Edward Markey (D-Mass) introduced HR 1053, the “Common 
Cents Stock Pricing Act,” which sought to require decimalization as soon 
as the SEC could make it possible.  The purpose of the proposed Act was 
“To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to eliminate legal 
impediments to quotation in decimals for securities transactions in order 
to protect investors and to promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.”65  As Oxley contended, “A modern decimal system is better 
for small investors…People are being eighth-ed and sixteenth-ed right 
out of their stock profits.”66  As Oxley further explained, “The Common 
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Cents Stock Pricing Act will eliminate regulatory obstacles that stand in 
the way of competitive forces.”67  Seeing the handwriting on the wall, the 
NYSE just three months after the introduction of HR 1053 voted to shift 
to decimals, and other exchanges like Nasdaq soon did so as well.  As a 
result, Oxley and Markey withdrew the bill, which never was enacted.68  
The SEC continued to play a large role in propelling the adoption of 
decimal pricing, ordering the NYSE and other exchanges to submit 
phase-in plans outlining how and when they were going to implement the 
necessary rule changes.  
With the SEC watching with approval, the exchanges converted to 
decimals in calculated stages, with the NYSE first reducing its minimum 
tick size from one-eighth to one-sixteenth.  By April 2001, in compliance 
with the SEC’s mandate, all the exchanges had completed their shift to 
decimalization, and stocks therefore now moved in increments of 
pennies.69 Decimalization struck another blow to the profitability of 
traditional Wall Street block trading desks70 and furthered the importance 
of both proprietary trading and automation of trading – the two 
ingredients of HFTs.  
More than a decade since the implementation of decimal pricing, 
there is still strong debate about its effects and whether the benefits 
exceeded the costs.71  As Greg Ghodsi of Raymond James contended in 
2009, “…decimalization is a negative because it narrowed the spreads.  
On the surface you would think it would be better for the markets but 
narrower spreads mean less profit for market makers.  Less profit leads 
to less capital and less capital leads to less liquidity [and more 
volatility].”72  Concurring, Jeffrey Rubin, head of research at Birinyi 
Associates, bluntly stated, “There is a direct correlation to the decrease in 
market making profits and the increase in proprietary trading at the likes 
of GS [Goldman Sachs], C [Chase], MER [Merrill Lynch], etc.”73   
Decimalization may have indirectly made it easier for HFT to 
proliferate in that perhaps people do not notice or mind as much giving 
up a piece of their trade if it is a small enough piece.  Decimalization also 
affected HFT by impacting the fate of the uptick rule (also known as the 
“plus tick” rule). 
The SEC had designed the uptick rule to reduce short-selling on the 
NYSE—and in the process, slow down a potential slide in a stock. 
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Instituted in 1938 during the heart of the Great Depression, the uptick 
rule (SEC Rule 10a-1) put restrictions on short-sellers, depending on the 
direction of the “tick” of the stock. A tick has been defined as “the 
change in the price of a security from trade to trade.”74  According to the 
uptick rule, if a stock were trading at a minus tick (a price below the last 
sale price) or a zero-minus tick (an unchanged price from the prior minus 
tick trade), one could not sell the stock short until it experienced a plus 
tick—a trade occurring at a higher price than the previous price.75  The 
rule was intended in part to assuage concerns about potential bear raids 
on a stock.  (Despite lacking evidence, some in the late 1930s continued 
to blame bear raiding for exacerbating the Great Crash of 1929.)  
 In the 1980s, program traders (as early electronic algo traders were 
called) and other constituents began to lobby to have the uptick rule 
repealed, arguing that the complexity of modern markets had made the 
rule out-of-date.76  It was the conversion to decimal pricing in 2001 that 
put the nail in the coffin of the rule; to many observers, decimalization 
diluted the value of the rule to almost nothing, because a penny uptick 
might be “just too small an increment to stop the short.”77 As Christopher 
Cox (SEC Chairman, 2005-2009) contended, “When a stock is dropping 
like a stone it tends to drop with…penny upticks along the way.”78 
Viewed as no longer effective, the uptick rule was repealed on July 
6, 2007 with little debate. Interestingly, the question arises whether the 
repeal helped HFT flourish.  Buy-side HFT is only a piece of the 
equation.  The other is selling.  For HFT traders who were endeavoring 
to jump ahead of another sell order, whether or not the uptick rule was in 
effect had no impact upon them if they were selling “long”  (i.e., owning 
the stock they were intending to sell).  If, however, HFT traders were 
intending to sell short (selling stock they had borrowed or did not own), 
now, after the repeal, they, like other short sellers, were no longer 
encumbered by any tick constraints; they could “hit the bid” (sell) on a 
negative tick, plus tick, or zero tick.  Previously, if HFT traders were 
trying to front-run a sell order, and it was a minus-tick, they could not 
sell if they were shorting that stock; they would have to wait for the plus 
tick. 
On February 24, 2010, roughly three years after the repeal of the 
uptick rule, the SEC adopted Rule 201, which the SEC described as an 
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“alternate uptick rule.”  As the SEC noted, the new rule “imposes 
restrictions on short selling only when a stock has triggered a circuit 
breaker by experiencing a price decline of at least 10 percent in one day.  
At that point, short selling would be permitted if the price of the security 
is above the current national best bid.”79  This, however, is a far cry from 
the original uptick rule.   
 
Demutualization of the NYSE 
Meanwhile, in 2006, the NYSE ceased being a not-for-profit 
organization. Shortly after converting to for-profit status, the exchange 
ceased being owned entirely by its members and became a publicly 
traded corporation. Either of these changes was momentous in its own 
right; together they represented a sea change.  For most of the twentieth 
century, the SEC had criticized the NYSE for being the equivalent of a 
“private club,” with members, who owned “seats” on the exchange, 
largely making their own rules.  Since 1934, the NYSE was not free from 
external regulatory oversight, but Exchange leaders long resisted 
fundamentally changing the organization’s not-for-profit structure. 
By the late 1990s and early 21st century, however, the two biggest 
exchanges (NYSE and NASDAQ) were in weak positions, in part due to 
scandals rocking them (first, a market maker quote-rigging scandal at the 
NASDAQ and then, in 2003, a specialist scandal at the NYSE—along 
with controversy surrounding the pay package awarded to the NYSE’s 
President at the time, Richard Grasso.)80  As R.T. Leuchtkafer has 
explained, in response to the quote-rigging scandal, “NASDAQ and its 
parent company the National Association of Securities Dealers (now 
called the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, or FINRA) were 
forced to implement changes allowing electronic communication 
networks (ECNs) into the market.”  According to reformers’ rationale, 
“…if market makers were cheating their investor customers, then 
investors should just trade directly with one another, bypassing the 
market makers altogether [through ECNs].”81  This opened the door, 
however, to HFT “scalpers”.82  The exchanges also were vulnerable 
because they were feeling the effects of SEC-driven rule changes that 
facilitated competitors at electronic venues acquiring market share.  As 
Arnuk and Saluzzi explain, NASDAQ and the NYSE eventually became 
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“publicly traded companies to access much needed capital to compete 
with the plethora of lightning-fast electronic trading venues.”83  But first, 
they decided to demutualize. 
As Jennifer Elliott at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) once 
explained, demutualization describes “the transition from a mutual 
association of exchange members operating on a not-for-profit basis to a 
limited liability, for-profit company, accountable to shareholders.”84  
Importantly, the SEC, anxious to rely more on technology than the hands 
of the specialists and market makers, became proponents of the idea of 
for-profit exchanges.85  With the SEC’s support, NASDAQ converted to 
a for-profit corporation in 2000.  The NYSE, after resisting the trend, 
capitulated in 2006, after Richard Grasso (NYSE CEO, 1995-2003) 
stepped down and John Thain, former Goldman Sachs President and Co-
chief Operating Officer, succeeded him as CEO of the NYSE.  The 
NYSE went public as part of the process of acquiring Archipelago 
Exchange (“ArcaEx”).  The fusion of Archipelago Electronic 
Communications Network (a pioneer ECN) and the Pacific Exchange, 
ArcaEx had gone public in 2004, becoming the country’s first 
completely electronic exchange.86 
The move to a for-profit corporation drastically changed the NYSE 
in many ways.  With enhanced access to capital, the NYSE (like 
NASDAQ) now possessed the means to invest more robustly in 
technology and data centers.87  But the fact that the NYSE now was for-
profit also introduced new, potential conflicts of interests; some of which 
may have affected the NYSE’s ability to critically evaluate the 
opportunities and dangers presented by HFT.  As will be discussed, the 
NYSE discovered that the organization could make money from HFT.   
 
The Enactment of Regulation NMS  
Meanwhile, the SEC had adopted a series of rules in 2005 called 
Regulation NMS (National Market System) that went into effect in 
2007.88  Flash Boys author Michael Lewis blames “Reg NMS” for 
causing HFT to proliferate, although as this paper discusses, HFT also 
had a host of other triggers.  Reg NMS was the SEC’s effort to further 
shape the national market system, which it had created in 1975.  As 
Lewis notes, Reg NMS held brokers to a new, seemingly higher standard 
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for fulfilling customer orders, as they now were compelled by law to find 
the “best price” for their customers, rather than the prior standard of 
“best execution.”  Lewis acknowledges that “Like a lot of regulations, 
Reg NMS was well-meaning….”89  Yet he also shows how and why it 
went awry.  After Reg NMS’ implementation, high-frequency traders 
could now much better predict the exchange(s) to which brokers would 
route their clients’ orders, because they knew that brokers had to obtain 
that best market price which was determined by a system known as the 
National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO).90  A relatively slow computer 
program, the Securities Information Processor (SIP), calculated the 
NBBO.  Realizing this, high-frequency traders seeking a competitive 
advantage soon tapped into far more sophisticated technology to create 
their own, faster algorithm of a best-price calculator.91  Lewis explains 
the results: “Reg NMS was intended to create equality of opportunity in 
the U.S. stock market.  Instead it institutionalized a more pernicious 
inequality.  A small class of insiders with the resources to create speed 
were now allowed to preview the market and trade on what they had 
seen.”92   
Moreover, Reg NMS indirectly spawned the rise of dark pools, a 
private stock crossing mechanism owned and operated by a brokerage 
firm or firms whose operations are visible only to those running it.93  
Some firms marketed their dark pools as a way to hide large trades from 
the machinations of predatory high frequency traders.  Yet the lack of 
transparency inherent in dark pools often served the purposes of the very 
flash traders the pools were ostensibly designed to avoid, as HFT firms 
sometimes succeeded in buying the right to operate inside them.94  In the 
sense, SEC regulations resulted in the look being transferred from the 
specialists of old to the HFT firms who have no public responsibility. 
Regulators had believed this rule would make the markets fairer by 
clamping down on any possible front-running of orders on the 
exchanges.  As previously discussed, front-running occurs when a trader 
puts his own order or his firm’s order ahead of his customer’s, and it is 
illegal if the order information used is not also available to the public.95  
Beginning in 2003, as Lewis recounts, the SEC investigated several 
specialists at the NYSE, accusing them of front-running orders, charges 
that were eventually settled only after the traders paid hefty fines.96  Reg 
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NMS was designed in part to curb such potential front-running by 
specialists but ironically, it created a situation ripe for a new form of 
what some call front-running, in the guise of flash trading. 
 
Transforming Specialists into Designated Market Makers  
Meanwhile, in 2008, the NYSE, in consultation with the SEC, 
instituted some changes to its membership classes, morphing the position 
of specialists into “designated market makers,” or DMMs.97  In October 
2008, as the NYSE relates, the SEC  “approve[d]  the [NYSE’s] next-
generation market model…, under which DMMs have accountability for 
providing liquidity, better access to capital and risk-management 
capabilities, and are on an even playing field with other market 
participants in terms of trading parity and access to information.” The 
NYSE noted that DMMs, like the specialists of old, retained “the 
obligation to maintain an orderly market in their stocks” (although one 
may wonder how they could effectively do so if they now are on parity 
with other traders).  DMMs also needed to “quote at the national best bid 
or offer a specified percentage of the time, and facilitate price discovery 
at the open, close and in periods of significant imbalances.”98  At the 
same time as the creation of DMMs, the NYSE also introduced the 
position of Supplemental Liquidity Providers or SLPs, who constituted 
“a new class of upstairs, electronic, high-volume members…with 
incentives to add liquidity on the NYSE.”99  SLPs formalized the role of 
Goldman Sachs and other upstairs trading desks that since the 1960s had 
been supplementing and filling the void of the undercapitalized 
specialists.  Combined with profit margins under continuous regulatory 
pressure, the additions of PhD-developed trading algorithms for 
proprietary desks and the advent of computerization, these upstairs 
proprietary trading desks were the forefathers of HFT. 
By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the specialist 
system that had been at the heart of the NYSE’s auction market was 
dying a slow death.  Decimalization, implemented in 2001, enormously 
hurt specialists’ ability to make profits, and then subsequent events 
continued to weaken the specialists’ position.  The human element on the 
NYSE was no longer what it had once been.   
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As Michael Lewis points out,  “Over the past decade, the financial 
markets have changed too rapidly for our mental picture of them to 
remain true to life.”  He contends that most people still possess an image 
of the markets in which “a ticker tape runs across the bottom of some 
cable TV screen, and alpha males in color-coded jackets stand in trading 
pits, hollering at each other.”  Lewis argues, “That picture is dated; the 
world it depicts is dead.”100  As Lewis himself acknowledges, there are, 
of course, still some humans on the floor of the NYSE, but his broader 
point is correct concerning the automation of trading.  This is the 
scenario that a host of securities regulators, over decades, worked to 
create, as they simultaneously labored to dismantle the power of the 
specialist system.  
 
Flash Crash of 2010; “The Crash of 2:45 pm” 
On May 6, 2010, a “flash crash” jolted traders, catching them off-
guard especially with regard to the speed and intensity with which it 
unfolded.101  During that crash, which was also called “The Crash of 2:45  
pm”, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) plunged 600 points in the 
span of just five minutes—a historic fall in such a compressed time 
period.  Then, however, equally surprisingly, the DJIA rapidly recovered 
most of that loss by 3:07 pm.  Such extreme intraday volatility stands in 
contrast to the type of “fair and orderly” market that the NYSE has 
hailed as critical to maintain.  Initial theories varied regarding what 
caused the mysterious crash. High frequency trading was considered as a 
possible factor—if not in causing the Crash, at least, in accelerating the 
market decline.102  
The SEC, in conjunction with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), examined the actions of high frequency trading 
firms during the turmoil as a part of their general investigation into the 
Flash Crash.  Yet in the 104 page formal report issued by the SEC and 
the CFTC on September 30, 2010, HFT comprised relatively little of 
their discussion.  Interestingly, though, especially with respect to this 
paper’s earlier discussion of the repeal of the original uptick rule, the 
Report did find that the HFT firms were net sellers during the Flash 
Crash.103 
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After concluding their analysis of what had transpired during the 
Flash Crash, the lawyers and politicians leading the SEC did not 
aggressively pursue their investigation into HFT.  Lewis suggests that the 
dilatory response stemmed in part from the fact that over two hundred 
former SEC staffers after the passage of Reg NMS had defected to work 
for HFT firms or firms lobbying for HFT interests; thus, some previously 
connected with the agency had a vested interest in maintaining the status 
quo.104   
Conceivably, too, SEC leaders and staff members might delay 
additional regulatory action on the HFT front in the desire to avoid blame 
for the situation. The imposition of new regulations (or the eradication of 
some older ones) might suggest prior mistakes committed by the SEC.   
Edward Kane, propounding the concept of a “regulatory dialect” in the 
1980s, once explained that “The dialectical view portrays regulation as a 
game of strategy with sequential moves.”  He elaborated, “In responding 
to changes in technology or regulation, individual moves are generally 
freer and executed more quickly for regulated players and whatever less 
regulated competitors exist than they are for the regulators 
themselves.”105  Kane concluded that among regulators, self-regulators 
react more quickly and with more freedom as compared to government 
regulatory agencies.106  
While some might suggest that, with respect to HFT, the SEC has 
succumbed to a case of blame avoidance107 or regulatory capture, another 
possibility is simply that government regulators lacked an intimate 
understanding of how Wall Street was actually working.  The SEC 
chairmanship position has been overwhelmingly occupied by lawyers, 
professors and politicians; only three of the 29 chairs since Kennedy 
have come from the investing community, and a mere one of those 
possessed actual trading experience.108 If the SEC had a former stock 
market insider as chair and if that chair brought more market savvy 
professionals to work at the SEC, one wonders whether the agency 
would have acted upon the concerns about the opacity of HFTs sooner 
and more efficiently. 
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Concluding Thoughts 
Government regulators often are perceived as being slow and late in 
addressing challenges posed by new technologies, and so to casual 
observers, HFT might seem like another such case of regulatory lag.  
Certainly, as Richard Scribner presciently noted in the mid 1980s, “By 
increasing the speed, dispersion, and complexity of the marketplace, 
…[technological] developments have introduced new challenges for the 
regulator…”  Scribner raised the question then of whether regulation 
could “keep up” with “the technological revolution in securities trading,” 
and the same question reverberates even more strongly today.109  As 
Scribner also noted, while technology has “sped trading” and impacted 
the markets in many other ways, regulators also can resort to technology 
to help them better monitor the evolving marketplace.110 
Lewis’ book has spurred calls for increased securities regulations to 
prevent (or at least, more tightly control) high frequency trading. Yet that 
is ironic, given that it was regulatory action, not lag, that helped create 
the current state of affairs that is conducive to HFT. Perhaps that is one 
of the key lessons here--that when well-intentioned regulators strive to 
fix a perceived problem (in this case, the need to modernize the capital 
markets and make them more fair), the remedy is often worse than the 
disease.  As Louis Kohlmeier Jr. explored in his 1969 seminal book The 
Regulators, regulatory agencies in the United States have sometimes 
erred as they have attempted to fulfill their tasks of protecting and 
prioritizing the public interest.111  
In the case of the SEC, the agency promoted numerous regulations, 
like Reg NMS, that have had often negative consequences.  While 
“unintended consequences” are a much-discussed problem stemming 
from regulation, it has been theorized that perhaps the likely outcomes of 
Regulation NMS had been understood by some and had been propelled 
forward nevertheless by those who stood to benefit from the rise of HFT. 
As Arnuk and Saluzzi speculate, “You can’t help but wonder whether the 
changed market structure [over the last fifteen years] is less the result of 
‘unintended consequences’ and more of a well-executed plan.”112         
Surprising at least some observers, high frequency trading 
proliferated after Reg NMS went into effect in 2007.  Soon afterwards, 
some market professionals and others sensed that HFTs were gaming the 
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market. As Lewis notes, it was 2009—five years prior to the debut of 
Lewis’ book and one year prior to the Flash Crash—when Senator 
Charles Schumer formally complained to the SEC about flash trading.113  
In 2010, high frequency trading gained some negative attention in the 
aftermath of the flash crash, but then the story somewhat faded from 
popular view until the publication of Lewis’ book in 2014 catalyzed 
concern. 
Popular trust in the U.S. securities markets, perennially in short 
supply, continues to be low, even as the stock market has rebounded 
from the crash of 2008 and the flash crash of 2010.114  Revelations of 
HFT, along with other opaque practices like dark pools and the selling of 
retail order flow to clandestine trading firms, have certainly stoked 
additional mistrust and suspicion.115  When such practices come to light, 
these revelations shake people’s faith not just in brokerage firms, but also 
in the market as a whole and in the capacity of the regulators to protect 
the small, retail investor from such abuses. The public would be more 
likely to trust the system if they trusted the regulators.116  If the SEC 
were led by someone not beholden to the system, and with the vision and 
courage to breathe new life into an agency so it can better interpret and 
enforce the laws we already have in place, instead of introducing new 
ones, the staff jobs would start to attract premier talent. And with better, 
not more, regulation, the public’s trust would be reestablished. 
Anxious to accrue public trust in the market, New York State 
Attorney General Eric Schneiderman has sensed the urgency of 
investigating high frequency trading.  While he readily acknowledges 
that “High-frequency trading is with us.  It’s not going away…,” he 
emphasizes, “we have to make sure we have a set of laws and regulations 
that send a message that everyone still has a fair shot to compete.”  He 
notes that “…the constant arms race of people having the incentive, 
which they have now, to try untested methods to gain those extra 
milliseconds of speed—that is a danger to the markets."117  
Perceiving a potentially simple solution to the problem, the founders 
of alternate trading system IEX came to the realization that it would be 
fairer if everyone had to go through a time delay before their trades were 
placed in IEX’s matching engine.  They contended that this would put 
everyone on an equal footing and would eliminate the issue of some 
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possessing more timely market information than others.118  Michael 
Lewis, in his book and in interviews, has hailed IEX’s innovative 
approach.119  Regardless of whether or not other trading venues could 
similarly remove the time advantage currently enjoyed by high frequency 
traders, the larger point here is that the solution to the HFT issue might 
indeed emanate from the private sector, not the SEC. 
In the meantime, HFT continues to wield enormous influence and 
represent comparable risk, at least partly through its use of high 
leverage.120 Decrying HFT, Michael Lewis has lamented the 
deterioration in what “once been the world’s most public, most 
democratic, financial market.”121 Ironically, as this paper evidences, in 
the SEC’s endeavor to make the stock market more fair by making it 
more public and more democratic, a largely unforeseen outcome arose—
the birth of high frequency trading—the antithesis, to some, of a fair, 
transparent, and open market. 
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NOTES 
1 Even more bluntly than in his book, Michael Lewis, in a 60 Minutes 
Interview (2014) stated, “Stock market’s rigged.  The U.S. stock market, 
the most iconic market in global capitalism, is rigged.” 
2 For another negative critique, see Scott Patterson, 2013. Notably, 
however, there are defenders of both HFT and the overall fairness of 
markets today.  SEC Chair Mary Jo White, 2014, emphasized, “the 
current market structure is not fundamentally broken, let alone rigged.”  
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3 See Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, pp. 18-20; note especially their blunt 
appraisal that “…the SEC is the creator of our Franken-Market.” p. 20. 
See also Lewis, 2014, especially pp. 96-101, on Regulation NMS. 
4 While we hail these factors as key, there are even more SEC-driven 
factors also at play here driving HFT, such as the imposition of 
Regulation ATS (alternate trading systems) in 1999 (mandating the 
public display of quotes) and the elimination of Rule 390 in 2000 (which 
meant member firms could now conduct transactions in NYSE-listed 
stocks away from the floor of an organized exchange).  On Rule 390’s 
repeal, see Thomas Mulligan (1999).  The NYSE eliminated Rule 390 
with the SEC’s encouragement. 
5 Definitions of HFT vary widely.  See, for example, Edgar Perez, 2011, 
pp. 2-4; also Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, especially pp. 24-26; Matthew 
Philips (2013). 
6 Kumiega quoted in Perez, p. 4. 
7 In the 1970s, an early pioneer of algorithmic, computer-based trading 
was Dean LeBaron at BatteryMarch Financial Management in Boston.  
See Jason Zweig (2014). 
8 See “Electronic trading platform,” “Algorithmic trading,” “Program 
trading.”  On ECNs, see R.T. Leuchtkafer (2012a, 155-158). When 
ECNs debuted in 1997, the SEC encouraged the development, as the 
SEC liked the idea of ECNs providing competition to especially the two 
biggest exchanges, the NYSE and NASDAQ. (p. 155). 
9 Latency has been defined as “the time it takes from when a trade is 
started to when it’s executed” (Philips, 2012).    
10 For more on HFT tactics, see Angel and McCabe, 2013, pp. 585-595. 
11 Angel and McCabe (2013, p. 589), however, challenge this notion that 
HFT allows certain privileged investors to acquire an advance look at 
other traders’ orders without their knowledge or permission.  If it is not a 
look at actual order flow, however, it certainly does seem to us that HFT 
traders, through various techniques, frequently obtain a look at potential, 
likely order flow, through their predictive, anticipatory strategies. 
12 See John McCain, S. Hrg. 213-413, Congress Session 113-2, June 17, 
2014. 
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13 In other words, physical proximity reduces latency.  As Philips (2012) 
explains, “The farther a signal has to travel, the higher the latency, which 
is why a shorter cable is a faster cable.”  
14 Several of the big HFT players are GETCO, Infinium, and Optiver.  
Arnuk and Saluzzi, p. 24. 
15 One such critic is brokerage firm founder Charles Schwab.  See Nancy 
Folbre, New York Times, April 7, 2014). Also see Charles Schwab 
Corporation (2014); Kathleen Pender, San Francisco Chronicle, April 
25,  (2014). 
16 In a sense, front running is a type of insider trading – insider trading on 
order flow. 
17 See also Angel and McCabe’s discussion of front-running (2013, p. 
589). 
18According to Columbia University professor and Nobel laureate Joseph 
Stiglitz, high-speed trading “results in sophisticated versions of front 
running,” and hence has created “an unlevel playing field,” quoted in 
Steve Matthews (2014). However, some disagree that HFT always, by its 
inherent nature, constitutes front-running.  See Caleb Johnson (2014).  
19 Angel and McCabe (2013, p. 589). 
20 Lewis (2014, p. 69). 
21 After much intense debate, the final enacted bill was significantly 
diluted from the Fletcher-Rayburn proposal. “Exchange Bill Passed…” 
(1934, pgs. 1, 3).  “Roosevelt Signs Curb Bill” (1934, p. 7).   
22 SEC, “The Investor’s Advocate….”   
23 Angel and McCabe (2013, p. 585) have insightfully inquired into the 
meaning of “fair markets.” 
24 Stock pools should not be confused with “dark pools.”  Unlike dark 
pools, which will be discussed later in this paper, stock pools are today 
illegal.  In a stock pool, a group of insiders grouped their money together 
and tried through rumor spreading, “painting the tape,” and other 
techniques to influence the price of the stock upward or downward, 
agreeing to split the proceeds with each other after they pulled the plug 
on the pool.  For an interesting discussion of pools and how perhaps they 
were not manipulatory, see Paul G. Mahoney, 1999, pp. 343-369. 
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25 Felix Frankfurter assembled a team to craft the legislation that 
included Benjamin Cohen, Thomas Corcoran, James Landis, and others. 
26 NYSE President Richard Whitney, the leader of the Old Guard, 
virulently opposed the proposed National Securities Act of 1934, 
contending that the bill would seriously impair and possibly destroy the 
market for stocks.  See Whitney, various Statements February 22-
February 23, 1934, February 29, 1934, March 22, 1934, NYSE Archives.  
See also “Exchange Supervisory Body Urged” (1934).  
27 On Joseph Kennedy’s role as first chairman of the SEC, see Ralph 
DeBedts, 1964; Ralph DeBedts, 1961, pp. 165-178; Joel Seligman, 1995. 
28 For a discussion of the rationale underlying keeping the securities 
industries primarily self-regulating, see Joel Seligman, 2004, p. 1347; 
also see Seligman, 1995, p. 439. 
29 Landis, June 19, 1935, quoted in Thomas McGraw, 1984, pp. 192-193. 
See also SEC, First Annual Report, 1935, p. 38. 
30 Douglas quoted in Chris Welles, 1975, p. 12.  
31 Floor traders trade for their own accounts on the floor of the exchange; 
specialists, tasked with making a market in each stock, under certain 
conditions trade for their own accounts as well.  In the 1970s, reporter 
John Brooks (1999, pp. 91, 94-95) once described floor traders as “those 
exchange members who play the market with their own money on the 
floor itself, deriving from their membership the unique advantages over 
nonmembers of being at the scene of action and of paying no 
commissions to brokers.”  Critical of the floor traders’ role, the 1963 
Special Study of the Securities Market recommended (to no avail) that 
floor traders “be legislated right out of existence through the interdiction 
of their activities,” as Brooks explained.  At roughly the same time, the 
NYSE commissioned a study of floor trading which concluded that 
eliminating floor trading would hurt liquidity and heighten stock 
volatility.      
32 Acting as a catalyst to bring buyers and sellers together is one of the 
five key functions a specialist performs, according to the NYSE. The 
other functions are “manage the auction process,” “execute orders for 
floor brokers,” “provide capital,” and “stabilize prices.”  NYSE, 
 
High Frequency Trading 
 
172 
Essays in Economic & Business History Volume XXXIII, 2015 
                                                                                                                       
www.nyse.com.  For simplicity sake, this paper consistently uses the 
term “specialists,” though since 2008, the proper term is “designated 
market makers” or DMMs, the new title reflecting some changes in the 
position. See “Specialists are Transformed into Designated Market 
Makers (DMMs),” (2008).  
33 As Seligman (2004, p. 1350) explains, “Indeed, section 10 invited the 
exchanges to go further and replace the specialists altogether with 
exchange officers or employees who could perform ‘the functions of 
specialists’ but would have no rights to trade for their own accounts.” 
Also see Seligman, 1995, pp. 85-86. 
34 “The NYSE and Nasdaq:  How They Work,” Investopedia.  Also see 
“Auction Market,” Investopedia.  
35 For a solid discussion of the historic role of specialists and market 
makers and the lack of such intermediaries in the new electronic crossing 
networks (ECNs) and HFT environment, see Leuchtkafer, 2012a, pp. 
155-159. 
36 Jay F. Coughneour and Daniel N. Deli, 2002, pp. 843-844.  Also see 
NYSE, Report of the Committee to Study the Stock Allocation System, 
1976.  
37 NYSE, www.nyse.com. 
38 Maintaining a position in a stock, a specialist stands “prepared to buy 
and sell from and to other members” and to the public, as stock market 
historian Robert Sobel (1975, p. 16) once explained. See also Sobel, pp. 
17-18.   On the role of the specialist, also see Nicholas Wolfson and 
Thomas A. Russo (1970, pp. 707-746); Kenneth M. Morris and Virginia 
M. Morris (1999, p. 63); NYSE, www.nyse.com. 
39 NYSE, www.nyse.com.   
40 Specialists were essentially referees, although their calls were then 
refereed by floor officials and potentially by the SEC. 
41 NYSE Euronext quoted in Andrew Haigney (2010). 
42 Interestingly, HFT defenders also invoke the same argument—that 
they add to liquidity and hence perform a critical function.  However, 
HFT may add to the sheer volume but not necessarily to the depth of the 
market, particularly since these traders often only hold a position for 
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milliseconds. Importantly, the idea that greater liquidity benefits all 
seems to be one of the enduring points of agreement among government, 
industry, and the public, yet the perennial question has been how to 
achieve real liquidity.  The NYSE’s historical and controversial answer 
to that question has been a designated responsible intermediary—i.e., the 
specialists. For a discussion of why HFT does not contribute “genuine 
liquidity” to the market, see Haigney (2010).     
43 Quoted in Sobel (1975, p. 18).   
44 As Sobel (1975) notes, some aspects of the specialist’s job had been 
scrutinized and criticized in the early 1900s, well before the 1929 crash, 
especially the specialists’ ability to buy and sell for their own accounts.  
The NYSE’s standard defense was that, as Sobel explains, “the specialist 
had to buy and sell for his account in order to maintain his inventory of 
the stock, and this was necessary so as to maintain an orderly market in 
the shares” (Sobel, p. 17). The NYSE argued that tampering with the 
specialist system would wreak havoc on the stock market. 
45 Among other issues raised were concentration in stock exchange 
operations and the high fixed rate of brokers’ commissions. The second 
installment of the 1963 SEC Special Study, issued in July 1963, also 
heavily criticized the floor traders.  On the SEC’s Special Study of 1963, 
see Brooks (1999, pp. 91-92). 
46 NYSE, NYSE Press Release: Specialist System, September 24, 1964, 
www.sechistorical.org.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Due primarily to mergers and acquisitions, the number of specialist 
firms had, though, already sharply declined, plummeting from 
approximately 230 firms in 1933 to 50 by 1983, to only 10 by 2001. 
Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, p. 26; see also footnote 3, p. 43: Brian C. 
Hatch and Shane A. Johnson, 2002, pp. 139-67. 
49 Historian Maury Klein (2001) once applied the “perfect storm” 
metaphor to describe the factors that coalesced to cause the 1929 Crash. 
50 For a discussion of the events leading to rate deregulation (“Mayday” 
1975), see Marshall E. Blume, Jeremy Siegel, and Dan Rottenburg, 1993, 
pp. 14-17, 23-24, 50, 52, 68, 107-109, 115, 128-142, 161-163.  Also see 
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Janice Traflet and Michael P. Coyne, 2007, pp. 131-141. 
51 Robert Haack, November 17, 1970, NYSE Archive. 
52 On the rise of discount brokerage firms post rate deregulation, see John 
Kandor, 2002. 
53 While some may argue that the perpetual quest for higher revenue and 
profits may have led member firms eventually to expand their proprietary 
trading activities even in the absence of rate deregulation, banks would 
have been highly reluctant to take on the additional risk of proprietary 
trading when they still had the safety net of the fixed commission 
umbrella.   
54 On the original Section 11A of the 1934 Securities Act, see Securities 
Act of 1934, No. 291, 73rd Congress, HR 9323, Section 11a, pp. 12-13. 
For the full text of amended Section 11A of the 1934 Securities Act, see 
Securities Act of 1934, as amended 2012, pp. 101-111. 
55 Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 34-51808, File No. 
S7-10-04, “Regulation NMS,“ September 29, 2005, p. 6. 
56 Ibid. 
57 The SEC contends that the NMS helps not just the investing public, 
but also listed companies by helping to reduce their cost of capital. SEC, 
“Regulation NMS,” p. 6.   
58 John Carney, February 4, 2013. 
59 SEC, “Market 2000: An Examination of Current Equity Market 
Developments,” (1994), quoted in SEC, “Report to Congress on 
Decimalization…,” July 2012. 
60 David Serchuk, 2009. 
61 Oxley discusses Wallman’s projection in Michael G. Oxley, 
Introduction of “The Common Cents Stock Pricing Act of 1997.” 
62 Peter Chapman,  1999. 
63 Oxley, Intro. of “The Common Cents Stock Pricing Act of 1997.”  
64 Levitt quote is from Serchuk (2009). 
65 H.R. 1053 (105th): Common Cents Stock Pricing Act of 1997.  
66 Oxley is quoted in Chapman (1999). 
67 Oxley, Intro of “The Common Cents Stock Pricing Act of 1997.”   
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68 See H.R. 1053, which eventually died, as did S. 838.  See S. 8283 
(105th):  Common Cents Stock Pricing Act of 1997. For more on S.838, 
see http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-105s838is/pdf/BILLS-
105s838is.pdf. 
69 For a historical overview of the move to decimalization, see the section 
on the regulatory history of decimalization in SEC, “Report to Congress 
on Decimalization…” July 2012, esp. pp. 4-6. See also Serchuk (2009).  
70 Block trading desks historically earned revenues not just from 
commissions but also from the buy sell spread, the latter of which 
dropped significantly after the implementation of decimalization.    
71 For example, studies have been done concerning the effects of 
decimalization on initial public offerings as well as smaller capitalized 
companies.  See SEC, “Report to Congress on Decimalization...” 
72 Quoted in Serchuk (2009). 
73 Ibid. 
74 “Tick,” Investopedia. 
75 There were some exceptions to the uptick rule, but for the sake of 
simplicity, they are not included here. 
76 Cynthia Crossen, 1988. On the uptick rule, see also Kevin Crisp, 2007-
2008, pp. 136, 144-145, 151, 156. 
77 Serchuk (2009) is describing former SEC chairman Christopher Cox’s 
argument.  
78 Cox quoted. in Serchuk (2009). 
79 SEC Press Release 2010-26, February 24, 2010. See also SEC, 17 CFR 
Part 242, Release No. 34-61595, File No. 27-08-09, “Amendments to 
Regulation SHO”, Final Rule. 
80 While Richard Grasso eventually was vindicated and won a lawsuit 
regarding his pay package, part of the argument brought forward by 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer was that Grasso’s pay package allegedly 
violated New York’s Not-For-Profit Corporation Law that mandated that 
CEOs of not-for-profit corporations be given “reasonable” pay.  “Spitzer 
v. Grasso: Greed is Bad,” 2004.  On the NASDAQ quote-rigging 
scandal, see Leuchtkeper in Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, p. 156. 
81 Leuchtkafer (2012a, p. 156).  
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82 Leuchtkafer, 2012a, pp. 156-158.  Leuchtkafer notes that HFT traders 
(or “market-maker scalpers”) discovered “there was a good business on 
the ECNs if they didn’t have to obey the same rules as the NYSE 
specialists or the NASDAQ market makers, and they didn’t.” (p. 156-
157). 
83 Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, pp. 56-57. 
84 Jennifer Elliott, 2002. 
85 Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, p. 57.  They further note that many of the 
SEC-driven regulations around this time were aimed at heightening 
trading efficiency, and they cite Regulation ATS and Regulation NMS, 
along with updated order-handling rules and decimalization, as 
examples.  
86 “The Institution of Experience:  S.R.O.s in the Securities Industries, 
1792-2010,” esp. the section on “Reorganizing the NYSE,” 
www.sechistorical.org. 
87 Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, p. 57.  As they note, the NYSE purchased 
Archipelago immediately after becoming a publicly traded company. 
88 SEC, “Regulation NMS.”  Also see Seligman, 2002, pp. 636-680. 
89 Lewis, 2014, p. 97. 
90 Ibid.  Also on Reg NMS, see Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, pp. 76-80. 
91 Lewis, 2014, p. 98.  On SIP and the NBBO, also see Arnuk and 
Saluzzi, 2012, pp. 30-31. 
92 Lewis, 2014, p. 98. 
93 For Lewis’ description of dark pools, see Lewis, 2014, p. 42.  On the 
birth and evolution of dark pools, see Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, pp. 127-
137.  Also see Patterson, 2013. 
94 See Lewis, 2014, p. 54 on Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) debating 
opening a dark pool and potentially charging HFT firms for the privilege 
of operating within it; RBC eventually declined to go down this path.  
For more on dark pools, see Lewis, pp. 42-44; pp. 85-87. Notably, in 
2014, several dark pools, including one run by Barclays and another by 
Goldman Sachs, came under investigation for some of their opaque 
tactics.  Also in 2014, as Reuters reports, Liquidnet, a dark pool operator, 
was accused of using confidential subscriber trading information for 
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marketing purposes, a charge it settled with the SEC for $2 million.  See 
“Fidelity, Other Major Fund Managers to Launch Stocks Dark Pool,” 
(2015). 
95 “Front Running: CNBC Explains” (2014). 
96 As Lewis (2014, p. 96) notes, the case was settled only after the 
specialists agreed to pay a $241 million fine.  See also “N.Y.S.E. Denies 
Investigation,” 2003; Greg Ip and Susanne Craig (2003); Kate Kelly and 
Susanne Craig (2003); “N.Y.S.E. Specialists ‘Front-Running’ Trial 
Begins,” 2006. 
97 As Arnuk and Saluzzi (2012, p. 26) note, four of the largest DMMs 
conducting trading on the NYSE are Goldman Sachs, Knight Capital, 
Barclays, and GETCO – the “four horsemen” who are also “HFT 
powerhouses.” Arnuk and Saluzzi go on to criticize DMMs for not 
providing genuine liquidity, unlike the traditional specialists (pp. 27-28 
and p. 55).   
98 “Specialists are Transformed into Designated Market Makers 
(DMMs),” NYSE Timeline. 
99 Ibid.  
100 Lewis, 2014, p. 3. 
101 For an excellent discussion of the Flash Crash, R.T. Leuchtkafer 
(2012a, 2012b) which are guest chapters in Arnuk and Saluzzi (2012) 
102  For more recent thoughts regarding HFT’s possible role in 
exacerbating the Flash Crash, see Andrei A. Kirilenko, Albert S. Kyle, 
Mehrad Samadi, and Tugkan Tuzun, 2014. 
103 SEC and CFTC, “Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 
2010,” September 30, 2010, especially pp. 45-46.  The report did not, 
however, specify to what extent HFT firms sold short during the 2010 
Crash, which would be more relevant to assessing the impact of the 
uptick rule’s removal.  Notably, the Amendment to Regulation SHO was 
in place when the Flash Crash occurred.  
104 In discussing the defection rates, Lewis points to a study conducted by 
RBC.  Lewis (2014, p. 106) concludes, “The SEC, like the public stock 
exchanges, had a kind of equity stake in the future revenues of high-
frequency traders.” 
 
High Frequency Trading 
 
178 
Essays in Economic & Business History Volume XXXIII, 2015 
                                                                                                                       
105 Kane (1986, pp. 188, 190) defines regulatory dialectic as “a 
conception that underscores the inherent conflict between attempts to 
regulate and attempts of regulated parties to lessen the burden of 
whatever regulations apply to them.” 
106 Kane, 1986, p. 190. 
107 On “blame avoidance,” see Kane, 1986, pp. 190-191. 
108 William R. Gruver, 2010. Gruver further notes that the SEC, due to 
“inadequate” resources and “misplaced” incentives, has not evolved as 
quickly as the securities markets it supervises. As he explains, the SEC 
has suffered from being “so myopically obsessed with discovering and 
pursuing relatively minor technical violations” that they miss the bigger 
picture and larger problems. 
109 Richard O. Scribner, 1986, p. 19.     
110 Scribner, 1986, pp. 20, 19-24. 
111 See Kohlmeier, 1969. 
112 Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, p. 14.  They note that the exchanges had 
been “lobbying for the regulations to turn out exactly as they wanted, 
when they wanted it.” 
113 On Senator Schumer’s letter to the SEC, see Lewis, 2014, p. 44.  The 
aggressive (and early) anti-flash trading stance of Senator Charles 
Schumer (D-NY) is perhaps a little surprising, given that historically, he 
has been a strong supporter of Wall Street.  His aversion to HFT may 
stem from his deep understanding of Wall Street and hence his ability to 
identify a danger to the public interest, and it also may reflect his desire 
to defend the status quo from the intrusion of interlopers (the “flash 
boys”). 
114 In a survey of 1,010 adults, Harris Polls in 2011 found that 70 percent  
of survey respondents “do not believe that people on Wall Street are as 
honest and moral as other people” (“Massive 6-1 Majority…”).  In a 
2012 Harris poll (discussed in Karlyn Bowman and Andrew Rugg, 2013, 
p.  4), only 7 percent of those surveyed were very confident in those 
leading Wall Street.  
115 This practice of selling retail order flow was pioneered by the 
notorious Bernie Madoff.  See Linette Lopez,  2014. 
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116 Gruver, 2010. 
117 Quoted in Bruno J. Navarro, 2014. 
118 As Conor Myhrvold (2014) explains, “Because everyone has to go 
through the delayed door to trade via IEX’s matching engine, this means 
that no one will have more up-to-date information on the markets than 
IEX will already have, and the price stays fair and accurate.”   
119 Brad Katsuyama and IEX are heavily featured in Lewis’ book.  See, 
for instance, Lewis, 2015, Ch. 2, “Brad’s Problems,” pp. 23-55. 
120 On HFT firms’ use of heavy leverage, see Arnuk and Saluzzi, 2012, p. 
16.  
121 Lewis, 2014, p. 69. 
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